Abstract
Introduction
The South African Constitution provides for a national system of local government. It charges local government with a developmental mandate and equips each municipality with a set of constitutionally protected powers. Provincial governments are tasked with supervising and supporting municipalities but play a minor role with regards to regulating the local government system. Municipal councils are democratically elected according to a electoral system that combines constituency (ward) representation with proportional representation. Politically, the local government scene is dominated by the African National Congress which controls the lion's share of municipalities, though with some notable exceptions, particularly in the Western Cape province where the City of Cape Town is controlled by the Democratic Alliance, the national opposition party.
Thus over the last fifteen years, South Africa has transformed its local government system from an illegitimate, racist institution into a democratic institution with a developmental mandate. Since 2000, a new generation of municipalities, led by democratically elected councils, comprise the local government system. By all accounts, local government has made tremendous contributions to the impressive record of extending service delivery to marginalised groups in South Africa. At the same time, the challenges remain daunting. Public perceptions of local government are negative.
1 Many communities and residents see their municipality as a locus of under-performance, corruption and inaccessibility.
2
The reasons behind these perceived and real performance failures are multifold and their discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, a particularly disturbing feature of the problems besetting local government is the perception that the 1 Levels of trust in local government (48.1%) are substantially lower than those in provincial government (59.5%) and the national government (64.3% This paper examines how the functionality of institutional relationships in municipalities contributes to this breakdown. It investigates whether there are aspects of the structural design of municipalities that prevent councillors from becoming champions of their communities. The paper also examines the interface between politics and municipal administration. It recognises that governance in South Africa may be decentralised but politics is not. It concludes that, while the local party caucus of the ruling party in the municipality should be the platform for rigorous debate of municipal issues on the basis of local concerns, it is often a proxy for regional and sometimes even national politics.
While this is inevitable and, to a degree, legitimate in any party-based system of municipal governance, the degree of detailed and undue interference is threatening to drive a wedge between communities and councillors.
The overall argument in this paper is that the functioning of municipal councils is too heavily tilted towards the preparation and adoption of executive and administrative decisions and that, as a result, municipal councils do not hold the municipal executive and the administration accountable. Communities thus regard councillors are 'complicit' in the municipal machinery rather than as possible change agents in their quest to engage the municipality.
The conflation of legislative and executive roles in the council by the Constitution is often posited as a design flaw and is therefore a golden thread throughout this discussion.
The paper provides some options for institutional change. Importantly, however, diagnosing institutional flaws and suggesting solutions for these flaws is but a small component of the overall improvement required. What will appear paramount in the discussions below is the need for ethical leadership on the part of local government politicians and their administrators, but also on the part of the party political structures that surround the local state. Municipalities, however, are tasked with managing these complex relationships in a small environment. The conflation of legislative and executive authority in the municipal council presents three specific challenges to municipalities. Firstly, it complicates the position of the speaker of the council. Secondly, the question as to who is in charge of the municipal administration becomes more difficult to answer. Thirdly, it invites municipalities to adopt inappropriate committee systems. These three challenges are discussed in turn. With respect to all three challenges, it is argued that separating the executive and legislative roles will not materially affect governance in a positive way.
Rather the solution lies in a better utilisation of the existing policy and legal frameworks and, importantly, effective political and administrative leadership.
The role of the speaker
The first challenge relates to the role of the speaker. All municipal councils are instructed by law to elect a speaker from among their members. 12 The speaker of the council is responsible, in the main, for the management of council meetings and for enforcing the Code of Conduct for Councillors 13 which regulates ethical conduct of councillors. In a context where legislative and executive roles are separated, such as the parliamentary system at national and provincial level, the role of the speaker is clear. He or she is in charge of the legislative chamber and plays little, if any, role in the executive of which he or she is not a member. Administratively, the speaker oversees the implementation of the assembly's budget, which is separate from the executive's budget.
In the local government context, where the executive and legislative roles are merged, the situation is markedly different. Firstly, in constitutional terms, the speaker is a member of the executive because the council is designated as the executive by the Constitution. Even though much of the executive decision making authority may be delegated by the council to the executive committee or executive mayor (particularly in larger municipalities), there are always executive and administrative decisions that the full council must take -under the chairpersonship of the speaker. 14 Administratively, the There are institutional and legal solutions that can be considered. As the problem is rooted in the conflation of legislative and executive powers, the separation of these powers would contribute to a clearer division of roles between the speaker and the municipal executive. The most drastic solution would be to abolish the office of the speaker altogether and return to the system whereby the mayor chairs council meetings.
Code of Conduct issues could be assigned to council committees (De Visser and Akintan 2008: 22) . However, the office of the speaker is now an entrenched institution populated by full-time office-bearers. 18 The abolition will face considerable political opposition.
Furthermore, to its credit, the office of the speaker has in many municipalities must be endorsed by every councillor for it to be effective. There is no point in 51% of the councillors respecting the role of the speaker as outlined in terms of reference when the other 49% of the councillors do not. The adoption and implementation of the terms of reference therefore requires particularly skilful leadership that crosses political and factional divides in order to achieve better governance.
Political-Administrative interface
The second challenge relates to the so-called political-administrative interface, i.e. who In practice, however, the political-administrative interface has become the 'achilles heel' of many municipalities. There is no doubt that councillors, members of municipal executives and officials are struggling to define clear roles amongst themselves. This is aggravated by undue political interference by political parties. There is growing concern around the inappropriate relationship between regional party structures and municipalities. There are reports of instances where regional party structures seek to operate municipalities by remote control. with the hard and immediate allocation of resources, jobs and power, rather than being limited to policy making, appropriation and oversight which is less attractive to the proverbial political fraudster. In that line of argument, separating the legislative and executive roles may thus remove the incentive for party structures to interfere in council decision making. However, it is suggested that transforming the council into a legislative and oversight body will not do much to mitigate undue party interference. Inappropriate interference would merely focus more directly on the municipal executive and perhaps even intensify with a clear target in sight.
What is suggested is a combination of political and institutional solutions. Firstly, political parties need to recast their roles vis-à-vis local government, particularly at regional level. While political party structures at national level cannot be accused of endorsing the rogue practices of some regional party structures, they clearly have done too little to make them stop. The position of the local caucus of councillors needs to be redefined. It should be repositioned as a political structure that is subject to strategic and ethical oversight by a party structure, which fundamentally trusts its 'deployees' to take decisions and does not second-guess or by-pass it.
Secondly, it seems strange that the local government system somehow agrees to the combination of party political office with municipal officialdom. A translation of the practice to the national government polity may indicate how strange the combination is.
Would it be acceptable for the Secretary-General of the African National Congress to be a Director-General in a national department, or for the Chairman of the Democratic Alliance's Federal Council to be a head of department in the Western Cape provincial government? Such a conflation of party-political and administrative office would undoubtedly raise eyebrows, yet the combination at municipal level is condoned. It is submitted that this is an area where specific institutional solutions are available and will yield positive results without major disruption. A specific provision should be inserted in the Municipal Systems Act to create a barrier between municipal officialdom and holding senior office in a political party. This would prod politicians to decide whether they wish to pursue a political or an administrative career, rather than seeking to combine both to the detriment of municipal governance. In addition, political parties themselves could insert a similar barrier in their internal rules.
Thirdly, the rules in the Municipal Systems Act surrounding staff appointments and staff discipline should be clarified. Practice indicates a number of areas of confusion. The legislation limits the municipal council's involvement with staff appointments to three aspects. Firstly, the council adopts human resources policies, including a recruitment policy, to be implemented by the municipal manager. Secondly, as indicated earlier, the council appoints senior managers. Thirdly, the council oversees the implementation of its human resource policies. However, practice suggests that council or councillors seek involvement with human resources issues on a variety of other levels. For example, the practice of councillors being part of appointment committees for staff other than senior management is not unknown, albeit clearly illegal. Also common is the practice whereby councillors sit in on staff interviews as observers.
Another major area of confusion is the position of managers. They are appointed by the council but report to the municipal manager, and the law is not clear as to where the responsibility and authority lies to discipline these officials if they violate staff codes.
This is often an arena where politics and administration cross swords because these senior managers are political appointments (made by the council). Add to this the worst case scenario, namely where the senior manager is an office-bearer in the structures of the ruling party, and there is no realistic way out of the conundrum. It seems clear that the rules regarding staff appointments and discipline need to be clarified. The Municipal Systems Act should follow the same hard line as the Municipal Finance Management Act and limit the council's role to the abovementioned three aspects. A serious debate is also required on the need for the municipal council to appoint managers that report to the municipal manager. This configuration is not followed in the national or provincial public services, where Deputy Director-Generals are appointed by the accounting officer of the relevant department. Why are appointments of senior managers in local government explicitly labeled as political appointments? The rationale may have been to seek synergy between the administration and the council, and it may have fitted the overall theme of a council that is legislator and executive in one. However, the practice is one whereby the appointment of senior managers is potentially a source of conflict and tension between the municipal manager and his or her political masters. That tension could be mitigated by placing the responsibility squarely with the municipal manager (perhaps in consultation with the mayor).
Committee systems
The political functioning of municipal councils is critical to ensure sound democratic practices that facilitate responsiveness of political structures, informed decision making and oversight. With regard to the latter, the Auditor-General, in presenting the 2007/08 audit outcomes for local government observed that financial management of municipalities improved significantly in areas where a ruling party is pressured by opposition parties (Pressly 2009 ). This important observation points to the value of democratic oversight as an indispensable element of good governance.
By conflating legislative and executive roles in the council the current system of local government does not create ideal circumstances for political oversight of the council over the executive and the administration. However, this by no means exonerates municipalities from using the system to facilitate oversight. In fact, the research suggests that many municipalities have adopted political structures that hamper, rather than improve oversight. This relates specifically to committee systems. More emphasis on the role of committees in exercising oversight over the municipal executive and administration should contribute to more responsive councils. When oversight and the measuring of progress is the desired outcome of a committee meeting, it provides a councillor with the platform to raise the concerns of his or her constituency.
On the other hand, when the desired outcome of a committee meeting is the preparation of an item to be submitted to the municipal executive, that same councillor will undoubtedly feel constrained, if he or she is not already overwhelmed by the technical nature that usually characterises these draft decisions.
It is therefore important for the improvement of local democracies that municipal committee systems function not only to support the municipal executive and prepare council decisions but also as committees that exercise oversight over the municipal executive and administration. This can be achieved without separating legislative from executive roles; municipalities should adopt section 79 committees, chaired by 'ordinary'
councilors, that operate to oversee the administration. In many instances, this will require significant investment in the functioning and skills of councillors that are designated to chair section 79 committees. In fact, municipalities will be quick to argue that there are too few councillors of the calibre required to chair a section 79 committee. However, if political parties and municipalities are serious about enhancing local democracies, more councillors need to be empowered to take up these roles.
Conclusion
This paper has dealt with a number of critical governance challenges faced by municipalities in South Africa. It is suggested that these challenges deserve the attention of municipalities and political parties, but also of supervising provincial and national governments. The quality of local democracies needs to be seriously improved if a more constructive relationship between communities and their municipalities is to be achieved.
The argument has attempted to shift the primary focus of attention away from the conflation of legislative and executive authority in the municipal council, while nevertheless recognising its significance. It is suggested, therefore, that instead of spending energy on examining a possible separation of powers in local government, the relevant stakeholders (i.e. national lawmakers, municipalities and supervising provinces)
should consider smaller institutional changes to the governance make-up of municipalities. Even more importantly, the political and administrative leadership of municipalities and the political structures that surround them should be acutely aware of the disastrous consequences that inappropriate behavior and political interference can have on the functioning of municipalities and therefore on service delivery. 
